South Africa fits within three migration subsystems: Anglosphere, Indian Ocean, and Southern Africa. These patterns of population flows challenge conventional dichotomous labels of North/South divides, developed/developing countries, or receiving/sending states. Stressing legacies of colonialism, Audie Klotz traces the emergence and then evolution of the South African migration state. Prior to apartheid, segregation developed primarily as a reaction to Asians and Africans moving to cities and towns. During apartheid, increasingly draconian enforcement of segregated mobility sought to reconfigure patterns of urbanization. Even with the demise of official apartheid and a plethora of efforts to remedy its pernicious long-term effects, municipalities remain on the front lines, trying to cope with administrative, financial, and political pressures that result from ever-changing migration patterns and persistent antiforeigner protests. These long-standing and overlapping subsystems call into question how to demarcate "Africa" within the global migration system.
Thiollet offers an overview of Gulf migration systems from the early 20th century to today. Mobility— motivated by trade, labor, politics, or religious devotion—is central to the region's history. Thiollet describes the changing geographies of immigration to the Gulf through three historical sequences. Gulf migration systems evolved from imperial geographies of colonial migration within the British Empire (1930s–1950s) to Arab regional integration during and after the oil-boom era (1960s–1991). Afterward, diplomatic interdependence with the Asian global South unfolded in the context of the diversification of Gulf economies, and the "second migration boom" of the 2000s took place. Thiollet then focuses on the contemporary era and unpacks the dynamics of migration governance in Gulf countries today. She describes the role of states, markets, brokers, and migrants in migration governance and illustrates the emergence of illiberal migration states, as a countermodel to liberal migration states in Western contexts.
How does the "migration state" concept travel across the global South and, in particular, in the Middle East and North Africa region? Gerasimos Tsourapas has two aims: first, he introduces the reader to the history and politics of migration into, out of, and across the contemporary Middle East. The chapter's second part demonstrates how a closer examination of Middle East migratory processes and distinct migration corridors sheds light on existing debates within the field. It identifies the emergence of an illiberal paradox across Middle Eastern states' migration policy-making—namely, the contrast between the socioeconomic need to allow mass emigration and the urge to maintain control over political dissent. Tsourapas draws on a range of case studies from across North Africa and the Middle East in order to detail how governments' attempts to resolve this illiberal paradox have arguably shaped the politics of migration in the Middle East.
This chapter focuses on labor migration and development in North and West Africa. Yves Charbit shows how demographic dynamics enhance and hinder development. Migration plays the role of an adjustment variable, as emigration is the simplest and most immediate response in states faced with chronic poverty and political and economic crises, often linked to climate change. Charbit seeks to disentangle the impact of migration on development from those of the other aspects of demographic change, births and deaths. He examines the consequences of three major economic and demographic developments. First is the demographic context as a driver of migration. Second are the remittances of migrants to their home countries. Third is the extent to which migration and remittances enhance human and economic development in the European Union–Africa corridor.
Chung extends Hollifield's migration state framework to Northeast Asian democracies, highlighting its limits and generalizability. Despite labor shortages from the 1980s and demographic crises, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have maintained closed migrant labor policies. Yet immigration to East Asia has soared over the past few decades; East Asian democracies have become known as "latecomers" to immigration. Among the largest non-Western economies that send and host substantial migrant populations, East Asia does not fit easily into binary categories such as global South/North, developing/developed societies, and countries of emigration/immigration. Neither do they adhere to the liberal/illiberal migration regime framework. Rather than convergence toward a singular liberal migration state, the East Asian cases suggest the emergence of a "developmental migration state" characterized by partially open borders and discrete institutionalized rights for specific subcategories of migrants.
Charles Hirschman explores long-distance migration, particularly from China and India, a characteristic feature of Southeast Asian history in the precolonial and colonial eras. Migration flows slowed to a trickle during the turbulence of the mid-20th century and were at a low ebb in the nation-building decades of the newly independent Southeast Asian countries from the 1940s to the early 1970s. The late twentieth and early twenty-first century, however, witnessed a resumption of long-distance migration within and between Southeast Asian countries. Uneven economic development, political upheavals, and demographic dynamics contributed to major flows of international migrants to Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore within the region and also to significant emigration of Southeast Asians to the Middle East, Australia, North America, and Europe.
All states are migration states, so what is distinctive about variation in migration management policies in the global South? Can the "migration state" concept explain a state such as India? Although India is a major labor exporting country, Kamal Sadiq demonstrates the emergence of an Indian migration state as a response to major immigrations from neighboring Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. India's alternative path to the institutionalized development of migration management is distinguished by a sequential transition from a "subject state" to a "postcolonial state" followed by the adoption of migration state features. Sadiq shows how India is unconstrained by a "liberal paradox" and is instead challenged by the "neighborhood effect" of thick, coethnic immigration flows amid weak state capacity. India emerges as a variation of the "classic" Western migration state model since historical legacies of partition and irredentism are key determinants of its institutional development.
Daniel Tichenor highlights the power of nativist and liberal traditions in American politics, illuminating how each has shaped the development of a distinctive US migration state torn between competing interests and ideals. Since the late nineteenth century, nativist movements and xenophobic politicians have fueled the US government's capacities to exclude, marginalize, and remove immigrants—especially on a racial, ethnic, and religious basis. Yet pro-immigration groups and policy-makers since the 1960s have secured important gains for diverse immigrant admissions and greater democratic inclusion of noncitizens. Over time, the rivalry between nativist and pro-immigration forces in US politics has produced lasting conflicts and paradoxes in American immigration law and policy.
Neil Foley argues that many Americans live with a sense of cognitive dissonance about nationhood. The United States, unlike most European nations, claims to be a nation of immigrants, yet it also tries to keep out immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers it deems undesirable. It welcomes immigrants when their labor is needed and turns them away when it is not. But this bipolar economic view of immigration over the last century fails to account for the interlaced politics of citizenship, immigrant exclusion, and unremitting nativism that lies at the very heart of American national identity. Culture and demography, more than economic and political developments, best explain the rapid growth of reactionary nationalist parties in Europe and xenophobic nativists in the United States in the twenty-first century.
Phil Triadafiliopoulos and Zack Taylor ask whether Canada has solved the liberal paradox. Whereas political winds in most liberal democracies are blowing in a restrictive direction, for the past thirty years Canadian governments have steadily increased annual immigration levels. Cross-party political consensus in support of an expansive immigration policy has endured economic slowdowns in the early 1980s and 1990s and the recessions of 2001–2 and 2009–10. Consensus on immigration extends to support of Canada's policy of official multiculturalism and liberal citizenship regime. Whereas multiculturalism has been judged a dangerous failure in many liberal democracies, it has retained pride of place in Canada, serving as an important source of Canadian national identity. And, despite some tinkering, Canada's liberal citizenship regime continues to transform immigrants into new Canadians at a high rate. Populist anti-immigrant politics in Canada are marginal.
As Martin notes, in North America unwanted migration preceded freer trade. But NAFTA and CAFTA-DR also contributed to "migration humps," that is, more unwanted migration as increased trade and investment accelerated economic adjustments in migrant-sending countries, including the movement of people out of agriculture. The Mexico-US migration hump peaked in 2000, and fell significantly after the 2008–9 recession. By contrast, there has been an upsurge of Central American migration, suggesting that Central America may be on the upside of a migration hump. Most trade and migration are regional, that is, between neighboring or nearby countries. The European Union, though, often provides aid and advice to induce changes in accession countries before their citizens gain freedom of movement rights, hoping that rising wages and opportunity at home translate into relatively little intra-EU migration.
Hazán reviews the turbulent social history of Latin America, intricately bound up with migration and population movements. Migration from Europe in particular was a dominant force in political, economic, and social change in Latin America, but over time emigration to the powerful and wealthier countries in the Northern Hemisphere became the norm. Zeroing in on the experience of Mexico and Central America, Hazán documents how Mexico went from being a source of surplus labor for the booming US economy to a country of transit, and now destination. She links developments in Mexico and North America with the failures of Central American countries to develop economically and to make the transition to democracy, leading to more pressures to emigrate, and widespread violence and violations of human rights. Finally, she returns to the broader issue of the transformation of South America into a continent of immigration.
Since the end of military dictatorship and re-democratization in the 1980s, South America has embraced greater economic openness and rights-based politics. As a result, it has been transformed into a continent of immigration. Gomes tests the argument by exploring how political pressures from economic actors propel governments in the region to adopt more liberal migration policies, tracing how rights-based politics led by civil society have pushed states toward more open borders under the aegis of new liberal constitutions, while free trade agreements have encouraged freedom of movement, rights of residence, and the consolidation of regional labor markets. New right-wing governments have moved to restrict migration and asylum seeking, only to find that they are constrained by human rights laws. Finally, Gomes shows how the Venezuelan exodus illustrates the dynamic of emerging migration states in South America.
Adamson applies the "migration state" concept to the question of migration governance in Turkey. Taking a longue durée approach, she analyzes Turkey as a postimperial migration state, beginning with a discussion of forced migration as a feature of postimperial nation-building, then discussing the use of ethnic and religious immigration criteria during the early Republican period, and examining the role that the Ottoman Empire and Turkey played as a destination for refugees and political exiles from Europe and elsewhere. Finally, Adamson discusses Turkey's diaspora policies in light of its renewed foreign policy ambitions, in which the use of diaspora politics as a means of projecting state power has emerged as part of a "neo-Ottoman" resurgence. She concludes with a discussion of future policy challenges surrounding migration in Turkey, and some thoughts on the strengths and limits of the "migration state" concept as applied to Turkey.
Lucassen reveals how debates in postwar Europe about migration and the role of the state in controlling or facilitating it is limited to certain segments of migrants. Migrants often only pop up on the political radar screen when they are low-skilled and are perceived as posing a threat to jobs, housing, status, and identity. Especially higher-skilled migrants, a portion of whom are employed by international businesses and organizations, are excepted from the problematizing political migration discourse. This conceptual apartheid affirms the self-fulfilling negative framing of migrants and reproduces the idea that migration is a problem that should be solved. Understanding and defining migration in much broader strokes helps us to put both optimistic and pessimistic views on current immigration in Europe into a historical perspective. It can also help us to understand better the nature of the migration state.
James Hollifield asks how states in Europe and the EU regulate migration, in the face of economic forces that push toward greater openness, while security concerns and powerful political forces push toward closure. States are trapped in a "liberal" paradox—in order to maintain a competitive advantage, governments must keep their economies and societies open to the movement of goods, capital, services, and people, that is, the "four freedoms." However, unlike goods, capital, and services, the movement of people involves greater political risks. To overcome the paradox, Hollifield argues that rights are the key to regulating migration in Europe, as states strive to manage trade-offs among markets, rights, security, and culture. He traces the evolution of migration states in Europe, which range from postimperial states to classic liberal and welfare states.
Bevelander observes that economic and structural changes in the European economy have led to a gradual increase in the low-skilled service sector, as well as an increased demand for educated workers in the production of high-tech content. The increase in the number of humanitarian migrants being received by European states, as well as the subsequent family reunion migration, has further weakened the economic integration of migrants in Europe. In addition to this, these migrants have to overcome a number of thresholds to be successful in the labor market. Policies addressing this problem have primarily focused on an individual migrant's shortcomings but have not addressed the structural barriers individual migrants face, which hamper their economic integration. Continuation of this state of affairs will both increase marginalization and segregation of immigrants and contribute to growing anti-immigrant sentiment, thus undermining the legitimacy of migration and welfare states.
Andrew Geddes develops an understanding of European Union migration governance that emphasizes not only the outputs or outcomes of governance (laws, policies, and the like) but also the understandings and representations of migration that inform it. The argument is that the EU actively contributes to "re-bordering," by which is meant that the perceived need to protect the internal European space and its project of market integration has seen limits both on free movement for EU citizens and efforts to regulate more tightly the external borders of the EU's member states. Geddes shows that migration governance is not just an ex post reaction to migration flows, but that governance systems through their actions, inactions, and interactions develop the categorizations that organize and manage international migration.